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Michael Tonry
Learning from the
Limitations of Deterrence
Research
ABSTRACT
Public policy and scientific knowledge concerning deterrence have long
been marching in different directions. Despite the proliferation of three-
strikes, mandatory minimum, and concealed weapons laws and retention of
capital punishment in 37 states, there is little credible evidence that
changes in sanctions affect crime rates, and there is no credible evidence
that capital punishment deters better than life sentences or that allowing
citizens to carry concealed weapons deters at all. There is evidence that
changes in enforcement and sanctions can affect some kinds of behavior-
for example, tax compliance, speeding, illegal parking-and there are plau-
sible grounds for believing that other deterrable behaviors can be identi-
fied. Doing so will require fine-grained studies that take account of of-
fender characteristics and perceptions, offending situations, and whether
and how new enforcement strategies and sanctions systems are
implemented.
The state of the art of policy-relevant knowledge about the deterrent
effects of the criminal justice system is little different in 2008 than it
was 30 years ago when the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel
on deterrence and incapacitation reported that the existence of a crim-
inal justice system has overall deterrent effects, there is a widely shared
intuition that penalty increases have marginal deterrent effects but the
available evidence is highly ambiguous and contested, and there is no
credible evidence that capital punishment deters homicide any more
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effectively than penalties that would otherwise be imposed (Blumstein,
Cohen, and Nagin 1978). There is some evidence, as Beccaria and
Bentham believed, that certainty and promptness of punishment are
more important than severity. Because there are differences in order
of magnitude in the abilities of police and courts to alter the prompt-
ness of their behavior or affect would-be offenders' perceptions of risk,
changes in police practices are more likely to achieve deterrent effects
than are changes in sentencing policies and practices. The capacity of
the police, however, to achieve long-term crime-reductive effects-as
opposed to short-term effects from well-publicized crackdowns (Sher-
man 1990)-is limited by practical constraints on availability of police
resources. Finally, there is considerable evidence that police, prosecu-
tors, judges, and juries often alter their behavior to offset the effects
of punishment policy changes with which they disagree, thereby un-
dermining the likelihood of achieving marginal deterrent effects.
There is little point in continuing to investigate these subjects in the
same old ways for another 30 years. There are, however, some other
lessons about future research agendas to be derived from current
knowledge. First, macro-level modeling of deterrent effects of changes
in sanctions policies by economists and econometricians has reached a
dead end, as Ronald Coase in 1978 predicted would happen concerning
subjects on which the economist's advantage was primarily one of tech-
nique.1 Results are inevitably fragile and highly sensitive to minor spec-
ification changes. Such research is incapable of taking into account
whether and to what extent purported policy changes are implemented,
whether and to what extent their adoption or implementation is per-
ceived by would-be offenders, and whether and to what extent offend-
ers are susceptible to influence by perceived changes in legal threats.
At the very least, macro-level research on deterrent effects should test
the null hypothesis of no effect rather than the price theory assumption
that offenders' behavior will change in response to changes in legal
threats.
Second, useful research on deterrence will have to become much
more nuanced than it has mostly been so far. Whether changes in legal
threats are implemented in practice and whether would-be offenders
'"Once some of these practitioners [social scientists other than economistsl have ac-
quired the simple, but valuable, truths which economics has to offer, and this is the natural
competitive response, economists who try to work in the other social sciences will have
lost their main advantage and will face competitors who know more about the subject
matter than they do" (Coase 1978, p. 210).
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perceive those changes are important questions, of course, but so are
differences in individuals' susceptibility to changes in legal threats. To
many, probably most, people, perceived changes will have no effects
on behavior either because their personal values and circumstances re-
move them altogether from the class of would-be offenders or, con-
versely, because their values and circumstances make them more or less
immune from changes in legal threats. Wikstrom (2007, ins. 28), for
example, argues that "inclusion of subjects who would never be moti-
vated to or consider committing the crime/crimes in question" is a
major shortcoming of many micro-level deterrence studies.2
Third, however, studies of the implementation of penalty changes
may, turned around, provide important insights into prevailing norms
concerning the seriousness of crimes and acceptable severities of pun-
ishment. It is at least as important to study why penalty changes have
little or no effect on crime rates as to study whether they have effects.
Penalty laws that are seldom applied, such as most habitual offender
and three-strikes laws, or that are routinely circumvented by officials,
such as many mandatory minimum sentence laws, are patently out of
step with prevailing norms; otherwise they would be applied or en-
forced. Their non- or partial application or enforcement is likely to be
among the reasons why such laws have little discernible effect. The
correct conclusion to be drawn from studies that show that penalty
laws are routinely circumvented is not that officials are misbehaving
but that laws are out of step with prevailing norms and should be
altered or repealed.
Although readers of this essay are unlikely to be laypeople, it may
be useful to say a couple of things that would be said in a talk to
laypeople on this subject. The first is that it is natural to suppose that
changes in disincentives to crime will change peoples' behavior. Often
they do. Human beings are influenced by incentives and disincentives,
and offenders are human beings. For relatively minor forms of pro-
hibited behavior such as illegal parking, fast driving, or littering, sig-
nificant increases in the perceived likelihood of apprehension or se-
verity of penalties influence behavior. When the threat of having an
illegally parked car towed goes up, people become more careful park-
ers. When speeding drivers see marked police cars stopped by the side
2 Others have made the same argument (e.g., Pogarsky 2002) and tried to take account
of it in their research designs (e.g., Bachman, Ward, and Paternoster 1992; Piquero and
Tibbetts 1996).
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of a highway, they slow down. Similarly, for calculated instrumental
crimes such as tax evasion (e.g., Klepper and Nagin 1989), increases in
perceived risks of apprehension appear to deter prospective wrongdo-
ers significantly (though much of this literature is based on laboratory
research and responses to hypothetical what-if questions, which raises
significant external validity issues).
The debates about whether penalties deter at all, or whether in-
creases in penalties produce marginal increases in deterrence, are not
mostly about those kinds of behavior. They are about the mass of
ordinary property, "morals" (drugs, prostitution, gambling, etc.), and
violent crimes. Typically, these crimes are not committed in public, like
driving, parking, and littering offenses, and often they are not highly
calculated. Most, however, are unambiguously wrongful, which means
that many people will not commit them under any but exceptional
circumstances. Many of these crimes are impulsive or are committed
under the influence of drugs, alcohol, peer influences, powerful emo-
tions, or situational pressures. Many are committed by people who are
deeply socialized into deviant values and lifestyles. These characteris-
tics of many would-be offenders do not mean that it is a priori im-
possible to affect would-be offenders' criminal choices by means of
legal threats. They do mean that doing so is far from being a matter
merely of enacting harsher laws, imposing harsher penalties, or adopt-
ing more aggressive policing strategies.
Another thing to be said to a lay audience is that thinking and knowl-
edge about deterrence are important. Policy makers would like to be-
lieve that penalties and penalty increases deter because those beliefs
provide a basis for trying to do something about troubling social prob-
lems. The difficulty is that mistaken beliefs in deterrence may lead to
adoption of seriously mistaken policies.
Three times in the last 30 years, American state and federal policy
makers have adopted major policy changes on the basis of deterrence
research findings that were subsequently repudiated.3 These were the
enactment of capital punishment statutes (and the U.S. Supreme
Court's upholding of them) in the context of Isaac Ehrlich's claim that
every execution saves the lives of eight would-have-been victims (Ehr-
' Findings on the alleged deterrent effects of capital punishment or "shall-issue" con-
cealed weapons laws were in both cases invoked by proponents of such laws, but support
for them was so ideological and the political impetus behind them so strong that it is
not unlikely that most would have been enacted when they were irrespective of research
results (see, e.g., Tonry and Green 2003).
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lich 1975);4 the enactment in a majority of American states of man-
datory arrest policies in misdemeanor domestic violence cases on the
basis of Sherman and Berk's finding that arrests deterred future vio-
lence against the original victims (Sherman and Berk 1984; later re-
pudiated by Sherman himself [Sherman, Schmidt, and Rogan 1992]);
and the enactment in many states in the last decade of "shall-issue"
laws mandating issuance to most adults of licenses to carry concealed
firearms in public on the basis of Lott's finding that carrying concealed
weapons reduces violent crime rates because would-be assailants are
deterred by the knowledge that a potential victim may be carrying a
gun (Lott 1998).' All three findings have since been shown to be in-
correct or not generalizable, but most of the capital punishment, man-
datory arrest, and concealed weapons laws whose enactment they in-
fluenced (or seemed to justify) remain in effect. The implication is that
policy makers should set very high evidentiary standards when consid-
ering evidence about the deterrent effectiveness of penalties before
adopting policies predicated on deterrence rationales.
Although in the last 30 years there has not been a huge amount of
research on deterrence, several small literatures have accumulated.
First, since the mid-1990s, a handful of American economists have
attempted to model the deterrent effects of capital punishment on ho-
micide and concluded that each execution saves, for example, 18 lives
(Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd 2003). The theory is that would-
be offenders' knowledge that capital punishment is authorized or that
some murderers have been executed will make them less likely to kill
people. This work has been discredited by other economists (e.g., Do-
nohue and Wolfers 2005) and by noneconomists (e.g., Fagan, Zimring,
and Geller 2006). The only credible conclusions that can be drawn are
either that capital punishment has no deterrent effects on homicide or
that there is no credible evidence that it does. This conclusion accords
with a recent review of this literature by Levitt and Miles (2007, pp.
474-76). Some analyses suggest that executions lead to increases in
homicide, possibly through a brutalization effect (e.g., Katz, Levitt, and
Shustorovich 2003).
Second, since the late 1980s, a small number of economists have
Solicitor general Robert Bork cited Ehrlich's work in arguing before the U.S. Supreme
Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), a decision upholding the constitutionality
of existing capital punishment laws in the United States.
'In 1994, 1995, and 1996, 13 American states adopted shall-issue laws (Lott 2000, p.
169, n. 7).
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attempted to model the crime-preventive effects of letting most ordi-
nary citizens (usually except children, some former felons, and the
mentally ill) carry concealed weapons in public places (e.g., Lott and
Mustard 1997; Lott 1998, 2000). The hypothesis is that would-be of-
fenders will be deterred by the knowledge that prospective victims may
be armed and able to use firearms to defend themselves. Although Lott
and his colleagues have concluded that allowing citizens to carry con-
cealed weapons has substantial crime prevention effects, his results have
been discredited by other economists on both technical (e.g., Ayres
and Donohue 2003b; Cook and Ludwig 2003) and ethical (Ayres and
Donohue 2003a; Donohue 2004)6 grounds and by noneconomists (e.g.,
Black and Nagin 1998). A recent U.S. NAS review of that research
concludes that there is no credible evidence that enactment of shall-
issue laws has measurable deterrent effects: "The committee concludes
that with the current evidence it is not possible to determine that there
is a causal link between the passage of right-to-carry laws and crime
rates. It is also the committee's view that additional analysis along the
lines of the current literature is unlikely to yield results that will per-
suasively demonstrate a causal link between right-to-carry laws and
crime rates" (Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie 2005, pp. 150-51).
Third, since the 1980s, a small number of researchers have at-
tempted to demonstrate that private possession of firearms reduces
criminal victimization and more than offsets harmful consequences of
private ownership of firearms including accidental injuries and deaths
and suicides (e.g., Kleck and Kates 2001). The hypotheses are that
would-be offenders are deterred by knowledge that prospective victims
have guns and that offenders desist from initiated crimes when they
learn victims are armed. The most authoritative reviews of this liter-
ature conclude that the claims are unconvincing (e.g., Cook 1991; Lud-
wig 2000). The recent NAS panel was agnostic: "Ultimately, research-
ers may conclude that it is impossible to effectively measure many
aspects of defensive gun use" (Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie 2005, p.
108; also see pp. 110-11, 117).
Fourth, from the mid-1970s through the late 1980s, evaluators in-
vestigated the effects of new laws expressly aimed at reducing crime
rates through the deterrent effects of increased penalties. Mostly these
6 Research ethics, that is. Serious questions have been raised about repeated systematic
errors in Lott's data and about other matters. Details and references to a supporting
literature can be found in Ayres and Donohue (2003a) and Donohue (2004).
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laws prescribed mandatory minimum sentences for offenders convicted
of particular crimes. The hypothesis is that knowing that use of a gun
in a robbery will result in a minimum 5-year sentence, or an extra 2
years on top of the otherwise appropriate sentence, for two examples,
makes would-be offenders less likely to carry or use a gun. The eval-
uations concluded either that there were no measurable deterrent ef-
fects or that there were short-term effects that quickly wasted away
(Tonry 1996, chap. 5). There were two primary reasons: there was little
evidence that offenders were aware of the harsher potential penalties;
more important, most evaluations showed that the increased penalties
were seldom imposed. In some cases, the prescribed "harsher" punish-
ments were less severe than offenders would otherwise have received.
In others, judges and lawyers altered their charging, plea negotiation,
and fact-finding practices to nullify the law's effects. There has been
little recent research on implementation of harsh mandatory punish-
ments, but the two latest major studies produced the same pattern of
findings as earlier studies (McCoy and McManimon 2004; Merritt,
Fain, and Turner 2006).
Fifth, during the 1990s, American policy makers implemented a
number of tough-on-crime initiatives, most notably zero-tolerance po-
licing in New York City and a broadly framed "three-strikes-and-
you're-out" law in California, and claimed dramatic crime reductions
through deterrence. Rudolph Giuliani, the New York mayor; William
Bratton, his police chief at the time; and their representatives claimed
credit for the happy correlation, as did governor Pete Wilson of Cal-
ifornia. However, no sophisticated study has shown that the policy
changes substantially affected the crime rate changes. American crime
rates peaked in 1990-91 in the United States, three to four years before
zero-tolerance policing was put into place and California's three-strikes
law was enacted, both in 2004. Preexisting downward trends in ho-
micide and robbery rates continued after the initiatives were an-
nounced, but neither the timing of the downturns nor the pitches of
the slopes were significantly different in California and New York than
in other populous states or large cities, respectively. The most exhaus-
tive examinations of the evidence conclude that there is no credible
basis for believing that the policy changes substantially influenced de-
clines in crime rates (Harcourt 2001 [New York City]; Zimring, Haw-
kins, and Kamin 2001 [California]; Tonry 2004, chap. 5 [both]; Har-
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court and Ludwig 2006 [New York City]; Taylor 2006 [New York
City]).
Sixth, since the early 1980s researchers have been investigating
threat communications and perceptions. A sizable literature demon-
strates that ordinary citizens are largely uninformed about the opera-
tion of the justice system, the content of the criminal law, and the
severity of punishments (Roberts et al. 2002). For a hypothesis that a
change in practice or policy will affect behavior to be plausible, there
must be some basis for believing that the people whose behavior is
being targeted will know about the change.7 A small but growing lit-
erature examines whether and how experience with the criminal justice
system, or peers' experiences of the justice system, affect perceptions
of risk and how those perceptions affect behavior (e.g., Pogarsky, Pi-
quero, and Paternoster 2004; Matsueda, Kreager, and Huizinga 2006;
Lochner 2007). A largely psychological literature has investigated what
people know and provided additional knowledge and then tried to de-
termine how that knowledge might affect behavior. This literature is
afflicted by two common problems of laboratory research: its subjects
are usually college students (rather than offenders), and its outcome
measure is how subjects say their behavior would be affected rather
than how their behavior changes. A related subliterature asks offenders
whether in retrospect they would have behaved differently had they
known what the penalties would be or if they had known that the
penalties would be even greater. Both the main and the narrower lit-
erature report that people say they would have altered their behavior
(the major works are cited in Pratt et al. [2006]).
Those literatures are not all examined in detail here. There is little
point in reprising discussion of the literatures on deterrent effects of
mandatory minimum sentence laws, major broad-based policy changes
(e.g., zero-tolerance policing, three strikes), possession of weapons for
self-defense, or threat perception. These have been exhaustively re-
viewed before, and no important original research findings have re-
cently been published. Section III briefly discusses the less often
reviewed research on capital punishment and concealed weapons. Be-
fore that, perhaps surprisingly, Section I discusses Robert Ellickson's
Order without Law (1991), an examination of the influence of civil law,
' And, separately, that they will be influenced by that knowledge. There are two other
important issues: whether the change is implemented as announced and whether changes
in practice are sustained.
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and knowledge about it, on cattlemen's behavior. Ellickson is a law and
economics specialist, and his work raises fundamental issues germane
to thinking about deterrence and offers arguments that may explain
why econometric research based on aggregate data is seldom instruc-
tive concerning deterrence. Section II is an overview of the major re-
views and meta-analyses of deterrence research. Section IV sets out
conclusions and a short agenda for research that might sharpen un-
derstanding of the deterrent effects of penalties.
Alex Piquero, who read an earlier draft of this essay, asked why an-
other review of the literatures on deterrence is needed, given that rel-
atively little, if anything, has been learned about deterrent effects since
Daniel Nagin reviewed the literature for Crime and Justice in 1998.
There are three answers. First, the economics literatures on concealed
weapons and capital punishment largely postdate Nagin's essay. Sec-
ond, those literatures make it clear that such studies of sanction ef-
fects-aggregate, macro-level studies relying on official crime data-
are unlikely ever to yield credible results. Third, however, more prom-
isingly, since 1998, micro-level studies have begun to emerge on how
offenders' (and their acquaintances') criminal justice system experiences
affect their perceptions of legal threats and their behavior.
It is important to stress, however, that I believe it is a Good Thing
that work by economists on the criminal justice system has increased
greatly in the past 10 years (see, e.g., Bushway and Reuter, in this
volume), even if I'm exceedingly skeptical about the likely value of
additional econometric studies of deterrence. Economists' distinctive
disciplinary frame and analytical techniques are likely to yield impor-
tant new insights into a wide range of subjects (e.g., the effects of
imprisonment on labor force participation [Bushway, Stoll, and Wei-
man 2007] and the costs and consequences of imprisonment [Raphael
and Stoll, forthcoming]).
1. Order without Law
Ellickson's Order without Law (1991) examines compliance with civil
laws affecting cattle farmers in rural Shasta County, California. This
may not appear to be an obvious place to begin an examination of
research on the deterrent effects of criminal penalties. It is a useful
place to start, however, for two reasons. First, both Ellickson's discus-
sions of how cattle farmers deal with recurring potential civil law prob-
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lems and a five-level model he develops for understanding what kinds
of knowledge and other considerations influence their behavior are
apposite to thinking about how criminal laws and punishments influ-
ence behavior. Second, the book is in some ways a report on an econ-
omist's (more specifically, a law and economics specialist's) gradual re-
alization that economic models sometimes grossly oversimplify how
humans make choices. This may be part of the explanation for why
some of the economists whose work is discussed in Section III (capital
punishment and concealed weapons) so often get things so badly
wrong.
A. How Cattle Farmers Deal with Legal Problems
Ellickson's discovery was that cattle farmers in Shasta County had
little knowledge of the law, confidently believed things to be true about
the law that were false, and resolved almost all their conflicts without
consulting the law or lawyers. In addition, local officials, police, and
insurance adjustors also often were unaware of relevant laws and shared
the farmers' views on dispute settlement. This surprised Ellickson as a
scholar of law and economics because that school of thought presup-
poses that people order their affairs on the basis of calculations of self-
interest in relation to the strengths of their legal positions.
Shasta County is a rural area in Northern California that, important
for Ellickson's interests, had "open" and "closed ranges" in the early
1980s when he carried out his field work. In open ranges, usually on
land owned by the American federal government or timber companies
and leased to the cattlemen, cattle are allowed to wander at will. In
closed ranges, cattle must be confined within fences. What happens
when cattle damage another farmer's crops illustrates the difference.
In open range, the crop grower must bear the loss unless his crops
were fenced in. In closed range, the cattle farmer is liable. Put differ-
ently, in open range, a grower must build fences to keep the cattle out.
In closed range, a cattle farmer must build fences to keep his cattle in.
Ellickson examined three kinds of disputes: damage to crops by wan-
dering cattle; obligations to repair, or contribute to repair, fences along
joint boundary lines; and auto accidents involving cattle. An old and
elaborate body of California law governs damages by different kinds
of animals under different kinds of circumstances (negligently roaming
versus purposely roaming animals; cattle and horses versus goats and
swine; circumstances in which owners are liable without fault versus
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circumstances in which they are liable only if negligent or reckless),
but farmers never resorted to legal proceedings or invoked legal rem-
edies to sort out these cases. Instead they resolved things by agreement,
by self-help, and by threatening or seeking informal community dis-
approval of the cattle's owner. Often, though, they did nothing at all,
knowing that other minor disputes and differences would inevitably
later arise and that both parties would realize that the responsible party
had some reciprocating to do. The farmers believed, and acted on the
belief, that their obligations for damage by animals depended in large
part on whether they were kept in open or closed range. Sometimes
as a strictly legal matter they were right about that and sometimes they
were wrong, but that did not make any difference to how the disputes
were resolved.
California statutes provided detailed and precise rules on responsi-
bility for fence building and maintenance. Shasta County farmers were
mostly unaware of these laws but instead observed well-established
conventions that largely but not entirely paralleled the statutory pro-
visions. They were mostly based on "community welfare" norms rather
than stakeholders' immediate self-interest. This apparently surprised
Ellickson, as a law and economics scholar, since individuals operating
outside systems of legal control are expected primarily to engage in
self-interested competition.
Automobile accidents raised more complicated issues. Cattle farmers
believed that the farmer should and would win in collisions with cattle
in open range, but that the driver should and would win in collisions
in closed range. Because of this, many open-range farmers did not
insure themselves adequately or at all for liability for accidents in which
their cattle were involved. California law made no such distinction. As
a legal matter, the question in either kind of case was who if anyone
is negligent, and how much of the responsibility for the accident is
attributable to that negligence?' In practice, Shasta County farmers and
residents dealt with accidents informally, between themselves, usually
observing the (legally nonexistent) open- and closed-range distinction.
They never resorted to courts or lawyers. The only court cases in-
volved plaintiffs who were not locals.
What Ellickson learned was that the farmers often did not know or
' California is a "comparative negligence state," which means that responsibility for
the loss and for making it good is apportioned on the basis of relative fault. In other
U.S. states, "contributory negligence" by a plaintiff bars any recovery.
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much care what the law was concerning matters of interest to them-
selves, preferred to and tended to resolve disputes informally, and ob-
served social norms that could be described as based on community
welfare premises.
B. How Economists Understand Legal Problems
As his work progressed, Ellickson felt obliged to read works by law
and society specialists, who attempt to understand legal problems in
their social contexts and who explore implications of social structures,
functions, and norms for understanding institutions and practices. In
the end, he concluded that "I must confess my suspicion that law-and-
society scholars, because they better understand the importance of
informal social controls, would better be able than the law-and-
economics scholars to predict the essentials of what was found in
Shasta County" (Ellickson 1991, p. 8).
Ellickson explains that most law and economics scholars adopt a view
of Ronald Coase (1960), one of the movement's founders, that "the
state functions as the sole creator of operative rules of entitlement" (p.
4) and that many economists "rarely shrink from applying in every
context the model of rational, self-interested, human behavior that they
borrow from economics proper" (p. 7). Elsewhere, concerning deter-
rent effects, Coase wrote, "Punishment, for example, can be regarded
as the price of crime. An economist will not debate whether increased pun-
ishment will reduce crime; he will merely try to answer the question, by
how much?" (1978, p. 210; emphasis added). This may explain why
economists, especially politically conservative ones, tend to conclude
that increased penalties must in the nature of things have marginal
deterrent effects and that capital punishment must deter homicide bet-
ter than other penalties do.
John Donohue, one of the handful of widely respected senior Amer-
ican economists specializing in studies of the criminal justice system,
observes that deterrence studies may implicitly challenge fundamental
economic presuppositions. In responding to an article by Gary Becker,
the "founder" of modern economic studies of the criminal law and
punishment (Becker 1968), and judge Richard Posner, law and eco-
nomics' most famous expositor, Donohue observes that Becker analo-
gizes punishment analyses to price theory: "Becker suggests that price
theory can fill in where empirical evidence is lacking: capital punish-
ment is akin to a rise in the price of murder and hence might be
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expected to lessen the number of murders" (2006, p. 4). He asks
whether many economists' vigorous defense of traditional economic
models of choice in relation to criminals' behavioral choices is in effect
a defense of price theory itself.
C. Conceptual Models of Punishment Effects
Ellickson described a world that is more complicated than many
economists assume it to be, one in which community welfare norms
sometimes trump self-interest, and in which legal threats only occa-
sionally influence behavior. He developed a five-level model of social
control (Ellickson 1991, p. 131):
1. First party controls (self-control)
2. Second party controls (other persons in direct contractual rela-
tions)
3. Social controls (informal social controls through norms)
4. Organizational controls (enforcement of organizational rules)
5. Governmental (legal) controls (state enforcement through law).
This model is important for law and economics specialists because
it makes clear that the fifth level, usually their focus, is but a small part
of the story.9 That would surprise few social scientists. Durkheim
([18931 1933), for example, argued that the criminal law's direct effects
(levels 4 and 5) through deterrence are modest at best and not espe-
cially important; their indirect effects through their interactions with
social norms (level 3) and social norms' effects on private behavior
(levels 1 and 2) are what matters.
Ellickson's model is also relevant, in a loose way, for thinking about
deterrence of criminal behavior by means of legal threats. Whether
individuals do or do not engage in criminal behavior is determined by
a mixture of personal, situational, social, and organizational factors in
addition to the criminal law's legal threats.
Many sociological and psychological models of criminality resemble
Ellickson's but are considerably more complex as they attempt to iden-
'The fourth level, organizational behavior and controls, which economists studying
punishment generally ignore, is where laws are and are not applied. Typical studies of
deterrent effects of increased penalties nearly always treat statutory changes as the in-
dicators of changes in sanction threats, without attending to the questions whether officials
have the capacity or the will to implement the increased threats. As the literature on
mandatory minimum sentence laws demonstrates (Tonry 1996, chap. 5), one or both are
typically lacking.
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tify and measure the myriad personal, social, situational, and environ-
mental factors associated with criminal behavior. A recent meta-anal-
ysis by Pratt et al. (2006) attempts to measure the much more nuanced
deterrence effects that such research investigates.
Wikstr6m's (2007) theoretical overview of deterrence tries to explore
interactions between moral socialization and legal threats. He con-
cludes that
law abidance is largely a question of an individual's moral education
(of which their deterrence experiences are a part) through which
they have developed moral rules and moral habits that preclude
them from engaging in crime. I have also argued that individuals
breach the law either out of habit, or by making a deliberate choice,
and that only in the latter case is there a question of whether or
not deterrence may influence their choice to abide by or breach the
law. I have also maintained that rationality and an individual's capa-
bility to exercise self-control come into play as factors only when an
individual deliberates over action alternatives . . . . Crime is fun-
damentally a question of morality and moral habits. (2007, ins. p.
37; emphasis. in original)
Ellickson's book, though it is not about criminal law, punishment,
or deterrence, nonetheless provides a platform for considering those
subjects. Shasta County farmers have little knowledge of the law rel-
evant to the disputes they most commonly encounter. Their disputes
are resolved primarily through interactions in Ellickson's first three
levels (personal morality, contractual relationships, and local social
norms). There is little reason to suppose that most would-be offenders
most of the time operate in Ellickson's fifth level.
II. Reviews of Deterrence Research
Knowledge of the deterrent effects of criminal punishments is little
different in 2007 than it was in 1978 when the U.S. National Academy
of Sciences Panel on Deterrence and Incapacitation issued its report
(Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978). A substantial body of work has
since accumulated, some of it on new subjects, but the main substantive
conclusions to be drawn have changed little.
The panel was convened to evaluate the evidence underlying Isaac
Ehrlich's claim that each execution in the United States prevented
eight murders through its deterrent effects (Ehrlich 1975). More gen-
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erally, it assessed research on deterrence and incapacitation that had
accumulated in the aftermath of publication of Gary Becker's influ-
ential early article "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach"
(Becker 1968). There were three principal conclusions on deterrence:
1. Taken as a whole, the criminal justice system has a general de-
terrent effect.
2. No conclusions can be reached on whether capital punishment
deters homicides.
3. Though the evidence is unclear, it is likely that marginal changes
in punishments have marginal deterrent effects.
Were a similar panel convened today, it would discuss additional
subjects, notably research on threat perception, natural experiments,
and the deterrent effects of concealed weapons laws. It would, however,
affirm two of the 1978 conclusions: the overall system deters and no
evidence-based conclusions can be reached about capital punishment.
On the third question-marginal deterrence-it would discuss stronger
support for the existence of marginal deterrent effects for some crimes
under some circumstances but conclude, as a practical matter, that few
policy changes can reasonably be expected to achieve those effects. On
the fourth substantive question-whether allowing private citizens to
carry concealed firearms in public places reduces crime-the panel
would decide that no conclusion can be reached (as an NAS panel
convened partly to address that question did conclude [Wellford, Pep-
per, and Petrie 2005]).
The critical question for policy makers is whether marginal increases
in penalties can reasonably be expected to reduce the incidence of
crime. Outside the United States, for example, in other English-speak-
ing countries or in most European countries, the other three questions
have little policy relevance. Death penalty statutes and laws allowing
citizens to carry concealed firearms in public are not in the offing. No
one seriously doubts that the system as a whole has some deterrent
effects, compared with a hypothetical situation in which there were no
criminal penalties; but in any case, no real-world policy makers would
consider doing away with criminal penalties.
A considerable number of exhaustive reviews of deterrence research
have been commissioned and published since the NAS panel issued its
report in 1978. Most have reached pretty much the same conclusions.
The Home Office of England and Wales commissioned a multiyear
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review of the evidence (von Hirsch et al. 1999). Three widely cited
and influential reviews have been published in Crime and Justice (Cook
1980; Nagin 1998; Doob and Webster 2003), and other reviews have
been published elsewhere (e.g., Pratt et al. 2006) or soon will be (e.g.,
Bushway, forthcoming). Three reviews by economists (Lewis 1986;
Levitt 2002; Levitt and Miles 2007), to the contrary, concluded that
increased penalties produce lower crime rates through deterrence;
these reviews draw almost entirely on analyses by economists, and nei-
ther cite nor discuss the larger deterrence literature produced by non-
economists.'" The most recent major review, a meta-analysis by Pratt
et al. (2006), examines a wide range of multivariate studies in sociology,
psychology, and criminology that test deterrence effects (broadly de-
fined, to include certainty and severity of punishments, effects of dif-
ferent kinds of punishments, and effects of nonlegal social and shaming
consequences of crime).
As a practical matter of criminal justice policy, the critical question
is whether marginal changes in sanctions have measurable deterrent
effects. The major broad-based reviews reach similar conclusions that
no credible evidence demonstrates that increasing penalties reliably
achieves marginal deterrent effects.
In 1980, Cook concluded that existing studies showed that "there
exist feasible actions on the part of the criminal justice system that may
be effective in deterring [certain] crimes . . . . [But the] studies do not
demonstrate that all types of crimes are potentially deterrable, and cer-
tainly they provide little help in predicting the effects of any specific
governmental action" (1980, p. 215; emphasis in original).
In 1998, Nagin observed that he "was convinced that a number of
studies have credibly demonstrated marginal deterrent effects," but
concluded that it was "difficult to generalize from the findings of a
specific study because knowledge about the factors that affect the ef-
ficacy of policy is so limited" (1998, p. 4). He highlighted four major
factors: the relation between short- and long-term effects, the relation
between risk perceptions and sanctions policies, the methods of imple-
mentation, and the extent of implementation.
Von Hirsch et al. conclude that "there is as yet no firm evidence
regarding the extent to which raising the severity of punishment would
enhance deterrence of crime" (1999, p. 52).
0 The reviews by social scientists, to the contrary, almost always discuss the economics
literature. I comment on this curious pattern in the conclusion.
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Doob and Webster, adopting the null hypothesis approach, noted in
2003 some inconclusive or weak evidence of marginal deterrence but
concluded that "there is no plausible body of evidence that supports
policies based on this premise [that increased penalties reduce crime].
On the contrary, standard social scientific norms governing the accep-
tance of the null hypothesis justify the present (always rebuttable) con-
clusion that sentence severity does not affect levels of crime" (2003, p.
146).
The three works by economists, summarizing work principally by
economists, find that increases in punishment achieve marginal deter-
rent effects. Lewis describes "a substantial body of evidence which is
largely consistent with the existence of a deterrent effect from longer
sentences" (1986, p. 60). Levitt, relying principally on data from two
of his own analyses, describes them as evidence "for a deterrent effect
of increases in expected punishment" (2002, p. 445). Levitt and Miles
conclude that "the new empirical evidence [produced by economists]
generally supports the deterrence model. . . . Evidence of the crime-
reducing effects of the scale of policing and incarceration is consistent
across different methodological approaches" (2007, p. 456).
The Levitt and Miles (2007) review is the most recent. In discussion
of research on shall-issue laws and deterrent effects of capital punish-
ment above, I have, using quotations from this article, indicated the
authors' skepticism about deterrent claims based on those literatures.
In addition, they discuss evidence on the effects of increasing police
numbers; they conclude that increased numbers are associated with
declines in crime rates but are unable to conclude whether this is for
deterrent (more visible policing provides disincentives to offending) or
incapacitative reasons (more high-rate offenders are apprehended and
incarcerated (pp. 468-70).
Relatively little attention is paid to the marginal deterrence hypoth-
esis. Most of the discussion of sanctions other than the death penalty
(pp. 470-74) considers whether increases in the scale of imprisonment
have reduced crime rates and, concluding that it has, to what degree
that effect has been achieved through deterrence and to what degree
through incapacitation. Levitt (1996) himself conducted one such study
in which, using aggregate state-level police arrest data, he attempted
to learn whether states in which courts ordered prisons to reduce their
populations experienced higher crime rate increases than states that
were not subject to such orders (he concluded that each released pris-
296 Michael Tonry
oner produces an additional 15 crimes annually). Marvell and Moody
(1994) looked at the effects of increased imprisonment rates on crime
rates and concluded that increased imprisonment yielded lower crime
rates though the estimates were considerably lower than Levitt's. A
major difficulty with aggregate research of this kind is that it does not
address the marginal deterrence hypothesis, and thus provides no guid-
ance to policy makers wondering whether increased incarceration of
bicycle thieves or street robbers will reduce bicycle theft or robbery. A
second difficulty is that it provides no insight into whether asserted
crime rate reduction effects result from incapacitation or deterrence.
One article by Kessler and Levitt (1999) gets closer to testing the
marginal deterrence hypothesis. It attempts to identify reductions in
crime rates resulting from the passage in 1982 of California's Propo-
sition 8 (which provided sentence enhancements for designated crimes)
and, concluding that there was a crime reduction effect, to disentangle
its deterrent and incapacitative elements. However, as Webster, Doob,
and Zimring (2006) demonstrate, Kessler and Levitt fell prey to a clas-
sic mistake: by examining data at 2-year intervals, the analysis missed
a longer-term downward trend in crime rates for all five crimes ex-
amined (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault with a firearm, and
residential burglary), which adequately explained the reduction in
crime rates. For four of the five offenses, crime rates peaked 2 years
before passage of the referendum and continued afterward, making the
continuing decline as likely to be the continuation of preexisting trends
as the result of the policy change."
The meta-analysis by Pratt et al., by contrast citing no economists,
produced a main finding, one "noted by previous narrative reviews of
the deterrence literature," that "the effects of severity estimates and
deterrence/sanctions composites, even when statistically significant, are
too weak to be of substantive significance (consistently below -. 1)"
(2006, p. 379).
" This is a common pattern. California crime rates began to fall 3 years before its
three-strikes law was enacted, providing a rich opportunity to politicians to compare rates
the year before the new law was enacted with rates afterward and to claim that the law
caused the decline (Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001). In the 1970s, the initial eval-
uations of California's Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law (1976) concluded that
compared with the year before enactment the law produced higher prison commitment
rates and reduced sentence lengths. Subsequent evaluations that looked at longer time
series showed that both patterns began several years before the law was enacted, making
the subsequent patterns merely the continuation of preexisting trends (Blumstein et al.
1983, chap. 4).
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That article, however, potentially illuminates a useful role deterrence
theory might play in understanding individual, social, and structural
influences on behavior. That would be to integrate deterrence ideas
and theories into much more nuanced accounts of human behavior that
allow for the contingent influences on behavior of individual, social,
and structural conditions; variations in threat perceptions; and varia-
tions in the nature and degree of implementation of crime prevention
strategies. They note, for example, four major theoretical develop-
ments that have influenced much recent research on deterrence by
social scientists. First, routine activities theories and their policy prog-
eny, situational crime prevention programs, assume predisposed of-
fenders and seek to prevent crime through manipulation of material
opportunity structures. Second, a considerable body of research in the
past 15 years has emphasized the importance of risk perceptions of the
social costs (e.g., shame, loss of others' respect) associated with pun-
ishment. Third, a variety of efforts have been made to embed deter-
rence analyses in other theoretical frames such as self-control and ex-
periential learning (through one's own and others' experiences)
theories. Fourth, punishment interaction theories stress the important
influences on individuals' threat perceptions of their own experiences
with the justice system (that experience might enhance or reduce the
effects of perceived legal threats). Analyses of these kinds are much
more in keeping with the analyses by Ellickson (1991) and Wikstr6m
(2007) that were discussed above than they are with traditional analyses
by economists that attempt to relate changes in behavior directly to
changes in sanctions while ignoring all the intervening stages and pro-
cesses. Levitt and Miles acknowledge, by contrast, that "the economic
model of crime differs from the major branches of criminology in that
it abstracts from the social processes and psychological aspects of of-
fending and emphasizes individual choices. A cost of the economic
approach is thus a loss of the social context of offending" (2007, p.
462).
I mention these developments because they point to the need for
much more precise delineation of deterrence questions than to ask
globally whether changes in sanctions lead to changes in criminal be-
havior. Whether people engage in particular actions in particular places
at particular times depends on their circumstances, characteristics, and
predispositions; the criminal opportunities and precipitants they face;
and the perceived consequences to themselves and others. The emerg-
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ing literature that focuses on and attempts to measure the effects of
events (e.g., arrests) that might alter perceptions is illustrative (Mat-
sueda, Kreager, and Huizinga 2006; Lochner 2007).
1II. Economists on Concealed Weapons and Capital
Punishment
Two new deterrence literatures emerged in economics beginning in
the mid-1990s. One, associated with economist John Lott, examined
the effects of states' enactment of shall-issue laws that required state
officials to issue permits allowing citizens to carry concealed firearms
in public. Although state laws varied in detail, the only circumstances
in which permits could generally be denied involved criminal convic-
tions for designated crimes and certain diagnosed mental conditions.
The other literature investigated the effects on homicide rates of states'
enactment of death penalty laws in the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), upholding
capital punishment laws meeting specified conditions.
Both literatures followed trajectories resembling that of Ehrlich's
(1975) finding that each execution would prevent eight murders. Each
attracted substantial attention, influenced policy making in important
ways, or was invoked by policy makers to justify their support for new
penalty laws, and was subsequently shown by other scholars to be un-
sound. In Lott's case the repudiation included allegations of "manu-
facturing data" (Donohue 2004, p. 623). 12
Both literatures are based on econometric models using Uniform
Crime Reports data on state and county arrest rates for serious of-
fenses. They typically use time-series data to compare arrest rate trends
for states enacting the laws hypothesized to have deterrent effects be-
fore and after the legal change and to compare arrest rate trends in
those states with trends in states not enacting such laws. Both litera-
tures are confounded by America's declining crime rates for 20 of the
25 years between 1981 and 2005 (declines in every year except the
period 1986-91). In principle that should have been relatively easily
soluble, but in practice it was not. The models in both literatures were
highly sensitive to specification problems, with effects disappearing or
12 The editor of Science (Kennedy 2003) suggested that a committee of scholars be
appointed to investigate Lott's behavior.
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signs reversing with inclusion or exclusion of particular states and
years.
A. Concealed Weapons
Lott and Mustard's (1997) original analysis used annual cross-
sectional time-series county-level arrest data for all 3,054 counties in
the United States for the years 1977-92.1' Concealed weapons laws
were in effect in eight states in 1977, and 10 other states enacted them
between 1977 and 1992.
The findings were strong:
1. "When state concealed handgun laws went into effect in a county,
murders fell by 7.65 percent, and rapes and aggravated assaults
by 5 and 7 percent" (Lott and Mustard 1997, p. 19).
2. "If the rest of the country had adopted right-to-carry concealed
handgun provisions in 1992, at least 1,414 murders and over
4,177 rapes would have been avoided" (Lott and Mustard 1997,
p. 64).
3. "The annual declines in crime from right-to-carry laws are
greater for murder (2.2 percent), rape (3.9 percent), and robbery
rates (4.9 percent), while the impact on aggravated assaults (0.8
percent) and the property crime rates (0.9 percent) is smaller"
(Lott 2000, p. 172).
4. "For each additional year that the laws are in effect, murders fell
by an additional 1.5 percent, while rape, robbery, and aggravated
assaults all fell by about 3 percent each year" (Lott 2000, p. 170).
The most exhaustive surveys by economists of research on the de-
terrent effects of enactment of concealed weapons laws conclude that
Lott's analyses are unpersuasive (Ayres and Donohue 2003a, 2003b;
Cook and Ludwig 2003; Donohue 2004). Cook and Ludwig conclude
that "the best empirical evidence does not support" Lott's conclusions
(2003, p. 595). Ayres and Donohue, having tested more than 700 al-
ternate regressions, concluded that there is "no credible statistical evi-
dence that the adoption of concealed-carry (or 'shall issue') laws re-
duced crime" (2003a, p. 1372). The leading reanalysis of Lott's data
by quantitatively sophisticated noneconomists reached the same con-
clusion (Black and Nagin 1998).
" The first edition of Lott (1998) updated the data through 1994; the second (2000),
through 1996.
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Levitt and Miles (2007) review the literature on shall-issue laws and
express skepticism. They note that other analyses, including one that
Levitt coauthored (Donohue and Levitt 2001), identify a long series
of problems that "raised questions" about the validity of the concealed-
weapons hypothesis.4
B. Capital Punishment
The disjuncture between conservative economists and everyone else
concerning the deterrent effects of capital punishment parallels that
concerning carrying concealed firearms. The most cited recent econ-
ometric 50-state analysis (partly using Lott's data) concluded that each
execution saves 18 lives (Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd 2003). The
most exhaustive critique of this literature by economists, which tested
the robustness of existing studies to alternative sample periods, com-
parison groups, control variables, functional forms, and estimators,
concluded that "our key insight is that the death penalty-at least as
it has been implemented in the United States since Gregg ended the
moratorium on executions-is applied so rarely that the number of
homicides it can plausibly have caused or deterred cannot be reliably
disentangled from the large year-to-year changes in the homicide rate
caused by other factors" (Donohue and Wolfers 2005, p. 794). An ex-
haustive critique of the recent economic literature by quantitatively
sophisticated noneconomists reached the same conclusion (Fagin,
Zimring, and Geller 2006). Levitt and Miles concurred. After discuss-
ing a long list of critiques of recent death penalty research, they ob-
served that "a large deterrent effect is surprising given the relatively
abstemious application of the death penalty.. . . Individuals who reg-
ularly participate in criminal activities with such hazards [high death
rates among street gang members and narcotics traffickers] are unlikely
to be influenced by the relatively low risk of capital punishment" (2007,
p. 476).
4 These concluded that estimates "lack statistical significance when the assumption of
the statistical independence of counties within the same state is relaxed"; that "passage
of a concealed weapons law did not correlate with a proxy for the rate of gun ownership";
and that "after controlling for abortion rates, the laws did not correlate with crime rates."
They also observed that "further tests of the behavioural implications of the concealed-
weapons hypothesis have also raised questions about its validity" (Levitt and Miles 2007,
p. 477).
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IV. Whither Deterrence Research?
Three overriding themes emerge. First, economic and econometric
studies of deterrence effects using aggregate data are unlikely to shed
useful insights into the deterrent effects of punishment. They are con-
ducted at the wrong level of analysis and are incapable of taking into
account vagaries in implementation of sentencing laws, situational and
circumstantial influences on offender decision making, or offenders'
perceptions of risk. Second, advances in understanding of offender de-
cision making are likely instead to emerge from work that takes ac-
count of offender characteristics (e.g., values, self-control), offender
interactions with other people, and informal social control in organi-
zational and legal contexts. Third, closer and richer studies of imple-
mentation of sentencing laws and punishment practices may increase
understanding of cultural acceptance of punishment options and hence
of socially optimal levels and kinds of punishment.
A recent publication of the National Bureau of Economic Research
provides another reason to be skeptical of the findings of the economics
and econometrics literatures on deterrence. It is understandably diffi-
cult for scholars to know much about legal systems other than their
own. American economists generally analyze only American data and
only data for recent decades. As Dills, Miron, and Summers (2008)
demonstrate, when analyses are extended to incorporate data from
other countries or are extended within the United States to cover
longer periods, few of the findings of recent economic research on
crime and punishment appear to be substantiated.
Only nuanced behavioral and social science analyses of the types
exemplified by Ellickson (1991) and WVikstr6m (2007) and included in
the meta-analysis of Pratt et al. (2006) are likely to add significantly to
current understanding of the influence of changes in law enforcement
practices and sentencing policies on criminal behavior. The policy im-
plications of such knowledge as emerges will lie primarily at the lowest
three levels (self-control, second-party influences, and social control)
of Ellickson's five-level model. The implications of new knowledge are
unlikely to have much relevance to development of policy at govern-
mental (legal) or criminal justice operational (organizational) levels.
New knowledge may have implications at organizational levels for
non-criminal justice agencies involved in formulation and implemen-
tation of public health, educational, and social welfare policies.
It is unclear to me which is more surprising: that so little credible
302 Michael Tonry
evidence exists that criminal behavior is much affected by changes in
punishment policies or that policy makers continue to believe that pol-
icy changes significantly affect behavior and that research continues to
test for their crime-preventive effects. Although I have observed in this
essay that understanding of deterrent effects has changed little over the
past 30 years, it can also be said that understanding has changed little
over the past two centuries.
Two images from eighteenth-century England when the number of
offenses punishable by death greatly increased make the point: pick-
pockets actively at work among the crowds assembled for the execu-
tions of pickpockets (Teeters 1967); and English juries regularly nul-
lifying the criminal law by refusing to convict obviously guilty
defendants of crimes punishable by death (Hay et al. 1975). The lit-
erature on mandatory penalties mentioned in the introduction reaches
similar findings: prospective penalties are seldom determinative of what
would-be offenders do, and officials regularly alter their practices in
order to circumvent application of penalties they consider too severe
(e.g., Tonry [1996, chap. 5] presents lots of examples).
There are good reasons why little research focused primarily on the
deterrent effects of changes in laws setting or changing authorized or
mandated criminal punishments has recently been carried out. The
research findings are so robust and so long-standing that most spe-
cialists believe we now know most of what we are likely ever to know
about the deterrent effects of sanction changes. Implementation effects
may be another matter. Research on local legal cultures and courtroom
workgroups as organizations may shed more nuanced insights into how
practitioners adjust their operations and policies to react to new or
altered sanctioning policies.
Only economists seem to conclude regularly that research will dem-
onstrate that penalty changes in general significantly affect crime pat-
terns and rates or that capital punishment in particular is a more ef-
fective deterrent than other punishments that might be imposed. For
example, Joanna Shepherd, an author of several studies finding a de-
terrent effect, in 2004 testified before the U.S. Congress that there was
a "strong consensus among economists that capital punishment deters
crime" and that "the studies are unanimous" (U.S. House 2004, pp.
10-11). Setting aside the problem that it is true neither that the studies
are unanimous nor that there is a consensus among economists, why
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might Shepherd believe her statements to be true? There are a number
of possible explanations.
Economists writing about deterrence do not seem much to read
work by noneconomists on the same subject. The surveys by econo-
mists of knowledge about deterrence seldom discuss work by non-
economists (Lewis 1986; Levitt 2002; Levitt and Miles 2007). This
might be seen as the result of disciplinary insularity or of disciplinary
hubris; but whatever the explanation, among the consequences are ap-
parent lack of understanding of fundamental problems with the sources
of aggregate national data that are analyzed and lack of knowledge of
processes of implementation and of offender ratiocination and moti-
vation.
As works cited above by Gary Becker (1968), Ronald Coase (1978),
and Isaac Ehrlich (1996), all quoted earlier in this essay, make clear,
many economists assume something to be true that social scientists
regard as merely a hypothesis: that offenders' choices to commit par-
ticular crimes are the products of rational calculation of the likely eco-
nomic gains of particular crimes offset by the likely risks of punishment
compared with likely net economic gains of available lawful employ-
ment. Other social scientists' models of offender (and nonoffender)
decision making are considerably more complex and contingent.
Ronald Coase, in an essay discussing economists' incursions into
substantive realms more commonly inhabited by other kinds of social
scientists, and their retreats, may have explained why many economists'
work on deterrence at macro levels has the characteristics it has. He
makes two relevant arguments. The first is that economists' contri-
butions will depend on whether their comparative advantage is in tech-
nique, theory, or substance. Theory he sees as derivative primarily from
substance, and technique is not enough: "to the extent that [econo-
mists'] movement [into a substantive area] is based on technique or
approach, we can expect a gradual displacement of economists from
their newly-won ground" (Coase 1978, p. 205)." 5
The second is that "the great advantage that economics has pos-
sessed is that economists are able to use the 'measuring rod of money,"'
which gives precision to their analyses (Coase 1978, p. 209). Since
money is an important determinant of human economic behavior, the
resulting analyses have plausible explanatory power. "It by no means
"5 See the quotation from this article in n. 1.
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follows [however] that an approach developed to explain behaviour in
the economic system will be equally successful in the other social sci-
ences. In these different fields, the purposes which men seek to achieve
will not be the same, the degree of consistency of behaviour need not
be the same and, in particular, the institutional framework within which
the choices are made are quite different.. . . [Understanding all this]
will require specialized knowledge not likely to be acquired by those
who work in some other discipline" (p. 208).
Coase's two points may explain why, after the flurry of work by
economists on capital punishment in the 1970s, little was published
until the 1990s. Ehrlich's work could not withstand close scrutiny by
people possessed of comparable technical skills but vastly greater sub-
stantive knowledge (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978). The work
by economists since the mid-1990s on capital punishment and shall-
issue laws has also followed the trajectory Coase predicted.
Finally, some or much of the work on deterrence by economists may
be conscious or unconscious products of ideological, as opposed to
merely disciplinary, ways of thinking. Dan M. Kahan (1999) offered an
informative analysis of deterrence arguments in which he suggests that
they are generally normative arguments in disguise. Americans hold
widely divergent intuitions about the purposes of punishment, includ-
ing whether for moral reasons killers should be killed. Disagreements
based on deeply held moral intuition are seldom resolvable by resort
to argument. Kahan suggests that seemingly technical and empirical
arguments about deterrence are really camouflaged normative argu-
ments: "The rhetoric of deterrence displaces an alternative expressive
idiom . . . .Ultimately the deterrence idiom takes the political charge
out of contentious issues and deflects expressive contention away from
the criminal law" (1999, pp. 416-17). Put differently, many people who
believe that capital punishment is morally permissible and in some
cases is morally required-who believe that the state should kill peo-
ple-are often uncomfortable saying that explicitly. Invocation of em-
pirical evidence that capital punishment deters homicides provides a
more comfortable rationale for laws they support for other reasons.
The same analysis applies to shall-issue laws. Many of their proponents
are Second Amendment ideologues. Lott's research provides an em-
pirical fig leaf to cover what is often an ideological commitment.
Many of the economists who have written on the deterrent effects
of punishments are well-known political conservatives-Gary Becker,
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Richard Posner, Isaac Ehrlich, John Lott-and others such as Joanna
Shepherd are less well-known conservatives. It is merely human to be
deeply attached to one's intuitions. Robert Nozick (1981, pp. 2-3),
writing of philosophers, observed, "When a philosopher sees that
premisses he accepts logically imply a conclusion he has rejected until
now, he has a choice: he may accept this conclusion or reject one of
the previously accepted premisses . . .. His choice will depend upon
which is greater, the degree of his commitment to the various prem-
isses, or the degree of his commitment to denying the conclusion. It
is implausible that these are independent of how strongly he wants
certain things to be true." So it may be with economists. John Do-
nohue (2006) argued that his fellow economists are committed to price
theory and a model of rational self-interested behavior, and this may
make it exceedingly difficult to accept that price theory is less apposite
to many forms of offending than it is to some other forms of human
behavior.
This review of the deterrence literature supports three main con-
clusions concerning future research. First, good research designs for
measuring the marginal deterrent effects of sanctioning changes on
would-be offenders' behavior must be much more fine-grained in the
questions they attempt to answer and in the ways they try to answer
them. Models or designs aimed at investigating effects of changes in
laws and policies or organizational practices (Ellickson's top two lev-
els), but that do not take account of social norms, personal obligations,
social contexts, and offenders' characteristics (his bottom three levels),
will not teach us very much.
There are some realms in which enforcement strategies and sanc-
tioning changes affect behavior and in which research on the effects of
legal threats may usefully influence policy. Examples include tax com-
pliance and evasion, illegal parking, and speeding. No doubt there are
others. In the Netherlands, for example, where there are more bicycles
than people, policy makers may need to develop effective ways to re-
spond to increases in bicycle theft. Or in any country, increased levels
of theft or robbery of new electronic gadgets create policy needs for
new preventive approaches. Often the best responses will be techno-
logical and situational, as, for example, when development of thief-
resistant automobile locks led to reduced auto theft rates in many
countries, but sometimes they may include changes in police practice
or sanctions policies. Well-designed micro-level studies that take ac-
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count of implementation patterns, offense circumstances, and offend-
ers' perceptions may well be able to provide important policy guidance
(Tonry 2008).
Second, following Doob and Webster (2003), research on the de-
terrent effects of sanctions and sanctions changes, especially by econ-
omists, should test the null hypothesis that sanctions changes have no
effects on offenders' behavior. Isaac Ehrlich, by contrast, has observed
that the
"market model" . . . builds on the assumption that offenders, as
members of the human race, respond to incentives. . . . This has
been the justification for applying economic analysis to all illegal
activities, from speeding and tax evasion to murder. Indeed, the
distinguishing feature of the major contributions by economists
has been the attempt to explain the various aspects of crime
through the tools of organization and equilibrium analysis, rather
than by reliance on deterministic social and environmental factors
that are independent of the human will. At least in the economic lit-
erature, there has been little controversy concerning this approach.
(1996, pp. 43-44; emphasis added)
There has, however, been substantial controversy among nonecon-
omists about that approach. No one argues that (sane) offenders lack
rationality, but many people do argue that credible research must take
account of offenders' personal values and norms, of their knowledge
of sanctions and sanctions changes, of the considerations and circum-
stances that shape offenders' choices, and of the nature and extent of
implementation of legal or policy changes. So far none of the major
economic literatures on the effects of sanctioning changes has with-
stood scrutiny by social scientists or by other economists.
Third, considerably more money and energy should be invested in
studies of the implementation of legal changes intended to alter pat-
terns of criminal punishment. A research finding that a change in sanc-
tions policies had no significant effects on offending should come as
no surprise if an implementation study showed that the change had no
effects on sanctions imposed. Put another way, implementation studies
examine a new policy's effects on officials' behavior. Sometimes new
policies have little effect because they overload organizational systems
or have resource implications that cannot be managed. Other times
they have little effect because they call for dispositions that officials
believe to be unjust or inappropriate and as a result do not impose.
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Not so long ago, researchers developing decision tools for judges and
parole boards viewed official noncompliance with punishment guide-
lines as indication that the guidelines were out of step with prevailing
notions of justice, and thus as a sign that the guidelines themselves
needed changing (Gottfredson, Wilkins, and Hoffman 1978). So it may
be with many of the punishment innovations of the past 30 years. We
may learn more from studies on the effects of changes in punishment
laws and practices if we more often investigate why they do not operate
as intended rather than whether they do.
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